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Abstract
During the 2016 US elections Twitter experienced unprecedented
levels of propaganda and fake news through the collaboration of bots
and hired persons, the ramifications of which are still being debated.
This work proposes an approach to identify the presence of organized
behavior in tweets. The Random Forest, Support Vector Machine,
and Logistic Regression algorithms are each used to train a model
with a data set of 850 records consisting of 299 features extracted
from tweets gathered during the 2016 US presidential election. The
features represent user and temporal synchronization characteristics
to capture coordinated behavior. These models are trained to classify
tweet sets among the categories: organic vs organized, political vs non-
political, and pro-Trump vs pro-Hillary vs neither. The random forest
algorithm performs better with greater than 95% average accuracy
and f-measure scores for each category. The most valuable features for
classification are identified as user based features, with media use and
marking tweets as favorite to be the most dominant.
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1 Introduction
Twitter is one of the most popular microblogging platforms with nearly 328
million users 1. In recent years, Twitter has become an alternative platform
to main stream media for getting news. Politics is one of the most prominent
uses of social media platforms due to their facilitation of reaching the masses.
Numerous guides and tips are disseminated for political campaigns for the
effective use of Twitter2 Most politicians have a verified Twitter accounts,
which they use to directly communicate with the public.
Twitter provides a lucrative platform for diffusing (mis)information at a
very low cost1, which can be easily utilized for targeting and manipulating
users. The 2016 US presidential election, where Hillary Clinton and Donald
Trump were presidential candidates, demonstrated the effectiveness of using
Twitter very well2,3. During this campaign approximately 400,000 social
bots (automated agents) generated around 3.8 million tweets corresponding
to 19 percent of all campaign related posts4.
Furthermore, recently Fake News has gained much attention due to its
prevalence and persuasive capacity5. The impact of believing such news
can be dramatic. For example, during US election 2016, a news, which
states Hillary Clinton used a pizza restaurant, as a front for a pedophile sex
ring became a viral, and resulted in an arrest of a person who entered the
restaurant with an assault rifle6,7. During the 2016 US election, there were
numerous fake news such as “Donald Trump Protester Speaks Out: I Was
Paid $3,500 To Protest Trump’s Rally.”8.
In order to propagate messages in accordance with an agenda, there
is an increasing incidence of employing social media users9. An investiga-
tion of fake news sites during the 2016 US election revealed that Veles (a
1https://www.statista.com/statistics/282087/number-of-monthly-active-twitter-
users(April 2017)
2https://www.onlinecandidate.com/articles/political-candidate-twitter-tips.
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Macedonian town with a population of 45,000) was the source of many pro-
Trump fake news10,11,12. In order to rapidly produce fake news, hundreds
of teenagers were employed in the city. Similarly, massive presence of bot
accounts in pro-Trump and pro-Hillary messages13 suggests existence of an
organized effort to disseminate a message.
Propaganda calls for coordination and organization. When carried out
effectively it can be quite deceiving and manipulate opinions and decision.
It can sway election results and impact the future of a country or the world.
Within collaborative and organized use, terrorist groups and extremists may
harm security and peace. For example, ISIS3 and White Supremacy Ex-
tremists (FBI declares as “Domestic Extremist Ideologies”4) strategically
use social media to recruit new members and to disseminate their propa-
ganda14,15.
The automatic detection of propaganda on social media may help to
protect social media users and services from malicious activity. This work
proposes an approach for the automatic detection of organized behavior,
which is likely to be observed in online propaganda. The term organized be-
havior is used to refer to a collaborative and coordinated posting behavior
involving multiple users, who serve an agenda. On the other hand, tweets
that are posted spontaneously without any predetermined agenda are re-
ferred to organic behavior5.
For the automatic detection of organized behavior, we propose a super-
vised learning method that utilizes features of collective behavior in hashtag
based tweet sets, which are collected by querying hashtags of interest. Nu-
merous user and temporal features are extracted from the collected tweets to
3ISIS is an extremist terrorist organization
4FBI known violent extreme groups: https://www.fbi.gov/cve508/teen-website/what-are-known-violent-extremist-groups.
5The organic term is borrowed from16
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feed machine learning algorithms to train a model for detecting organized
behavior. After the analysis of over 200 million tweets which are mainly
posted during the 2016 US presidential election The model is trained using
a training data set with 851 records. The 851 records in the training data
set reflects the analysis of over 200 million tweets which are posted mainly
during the 2016 US presidential election.
All of the features in the training data set are extracted by analyzing
user characteristics & temporal tweeting patterns, which are independent
of the content (except for sentiment based feature) and graph related fea-
tures. In other words, they are based on the characteristics of a poster and
the presence of temporal coordination among the tweets. This is akin to
sensing that something is up without knowing what is up. To discover the
latter further analysis would be required on content. The content and graph
related features are not used, because extraction of these features are not
cheap and easy compared to user & temporal features. Thus, this might
affect the performance of near real time automatic detection. Given the
massive quantity of content, such detection is deemed to be of significance,
since malicious content can quickly become trending and spread to millions
of users.
Finally, the extracted features are used to train models to predict tweet
set behavior in each of the three categories [organized behavior vs. organic
behavior], [pro-Trump vs. pro-Hillary vs. none] and [political vs. non-
political]. The trained models gave promising results for each category,
where the Random Forest algorithm consistently resulted in high scores
with an average accuracy and f-measure greater than 0.95. Although the
training data size, 851 records, is somewhat small for a supervised learning
approach, the resulting classification models are able to distinguish tweet
sets among the categories and are encouraging for use in larger systems.
This work proposes a proof of concept method for the near real time
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detection of propaganda and organized behavior. The main contributions of
this work are as follows: a classification model to detect organized behavior
in tweet sets based on only user and temporal posting features, a prototype
implementation for feature extraction & classification, qualitative and quan-
titative description of features of tweet sets involving the controversial 2016
US election.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes
background information required to follow this work; Section 3 presents
related work; Section 4 describes the overall approach; Section 5 presents
the proposed model; Section 6 provides definitions of the extracted features;
Section 7 presents the experiments and results; Section 8 discusses the results
and future work; Section 9 concluding remarks.
2 BACKGROUND
This section provides information about the tools and techniques utilized
during the prototype development of the model.
2.1 Twitter
There are many Twitter related terms17, the most relevant of which are
described here. Twitter is a social networking application that supports
posting short messages called tweets. The main connection among users is
the follow relations.
The act of propagating a tweet is called retweet ing. The more a tweet is
retweeted the more visible it becomes. However, since the volume of tweets
is very high, the chances of an individual tweet being seen is very low.
A reference to another user is made using a mention6 , which is a user
name preceded by the character (i.e. @theRealDonaldTrump). A reply to a
6For more information about Twitter entities see:
https://developer.twitter.com/en/docs/tweets/data-dictionary/overview/entities-object1
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tweet, is a tweet whose first token is a mention corresponding to the replier.
Twitter sends notifications to users when they are mentioned, bringing at-
tention to who did the mentioning and why.
A hashtag, a string preceeded by #, is used to tag a tweet. When used in
multiple tweets by multiple people, it serves to create a relationship among
tweets. This is widely performed during events as well as with people and
topics.
The Twitter REST API7 provides a great variety of methods with some
access limits to prevent excessive queries 8 In this study, the User Timeline
API is used for fetching the tweets of a user in a given time interval.
The Twitter Search API supports queries subject to various criteria,
such as a hashtag, or a geographic location. Queries return results from a
sampling of tweets which are posted in recent 7 days. Results of queries,
are therefore, subject to the limitations of the sampling algorithms of the
Twitter API, which claims to be optimized for relevance.
2.2 Supervised Classification Methods
In machine learning, classification refers to the task of automatically identi-
fying the category of an entity. There are three main approaches to learning:
supervised, semi-supervised, and unsupervised18. This work relies on super-
vised learning methods where a model is trained with datasets consisting of
labeled data samples (observations) that identify the class of the data. The
models generated with these approaches are used to predict the classes in
unlabeled datasets. This work examines three supervised learning meth-
ods to detect organized behavior: random forest, support vector machine
(SVM), and logistic regression.
The random forest approach creates a forest of random decorrelated
7Twitter REST API: https://developer.twitter.com/en/docs (accessed:2017-09-
28).
8For rate limits see:https://developer.twitter.com/en/docs/basics/rate-limits.
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decision trees from a trained feature set19. The resulting forest is used to
predict a classification based on the most predicted class by its decision
trees. The support vector machine method aims to identify a hyperplane
that best divides a dataset into two classes. It finds hyperplanes in high
dimensional spaces with the greatest possible margin between it and the data
points, which increases the confidence18,20. SVMs work better on smaller
and cleaner datasets. Logistic regression is a statistical approach that is
applied to machine learning19. It is well suited for binary classification
problems.
In supervised learning methods, there is the risk of generating overfitted
models when training data sets are small or there are a large number of
features. An overfitted model results in good accuracy with training data,
but low accuracy with test data. The use of resampling techniques21 makes
it possible to train non-biased classifier models by increasing the variance
in the training data set. In statistics, resampling methods may be used to
generate random subsets to test the success of classification models. The
ten fold cross validation divides the training data set into ten subsamples.
During the training phase, it generates models from nine subsamples of the
training data, which are tested with the tenth subsample. This process is
repeated ten times for each subsample in training data and test data. The
results of these tests are averaged to determine whether the generated model
is satisfactory22.
Principal component analysis (PCA) is a statistical method for explain-
ing data with large number of variable using a smaller number of variables
called the principal components. PCA aims to find the minimum number of
uncorrelated features with the highest variances to reduce dimension in the
data set18.
The Apache Spark23 machine learning library provides a wide range
of support including all the classifications methods described here. In the
7
prototype implementation, classification experiments have relied on Spark
while PCA and feature selection processes are done by Weka24, which is a
data mining software.
3 Related Work
The work in the area of detecting online behavior can be categorized into
three main types: behavior detection, spam detection, content and group
detection.
Cao16 examines the URL sharing behavior in Twitter and distinguishes
the sharing behaviors as organic and organized. For the detection of or-
ganized urls, a graph is generated with nodes representing users and edges
representing the use of the same URLs in posts. A community detection
algorithm using the Louvain method25 is applied to the graph to extract
user groups. Then, URL and posting time based features of those users are
extracted and supervised classifications methods, such as Random Forest,
NBTree, SMO and LogitBoost, are applied on manually labeled training
data with 406 organic and 406 organized records. After the training phase
with 10-fold cross validation, it is shown that applied approach gives a per-
formance around 0.8, in all methods, while Random Forest works best with
high F measure (0.836) and ROC area (0.921).
Similarly, Ratkiewicz26 studied astroturf political campaigns, which are
run by politically-motivated individuals and organizations that use multiple
centrally-controlled accounts. During the study, topological, content-based
and crowdsourced features of information diffusion networks on Twitter are
extracted. These features are mainly extracted from composed directed
graph whose nodes represent individual user accounts and edges represent
the retweet, mention, reply events between users. Supervised Learning
Methods are used for understanding early stages of viral diffusion. It is
presented that their approach gives accuracy results better than 96% in the
8
detection of astroturf content in a dataset of 2010 US midterm elections.
In another study about the classification of group behaviors27, it is aimed
to detect criminal and anti-social activities in social media. To detect these
behaviors, the theories of group behaviors and interactions were developed.
Also, graph matching algorithms are applied to explore consistent social in-
teractions, which suggest that complex collaborative behaviors can be mod-
eled and detected using a concept of group behavior grammars.
Also, in order to disclose spam URLs, Cao28 analyzed behavioral features
in three categories : click-based, posting based, clicking statistics. With
these features, a training data set is created with 1,049 spam and benign
urls by checking the labels of urls in the tweets from a category website.
Another training data set is created by manual labelling of 219 benign and
79 spam urls. For the both behavioral features in two training data sets,
random forest algorithm is used as supervised learning method by using
10-fold cross validation. The algorithm is trained by using all feature sets
together and separately such as click-based, posting based, clicking statistics.
With this approach, 86% of accuracy is found by using all features for the
training.
In another research, political bot accounts, who take place in Brexit Ref-
erendum and play strategic role in referendum conversations, are analyzed9.
It is found that these bots use excessively the family of hashtags associated
with the argument for leaving the European Union, and utilize different lev-
els of automation. It is stated that these bots, which compose one percent of
sampled accounts, generate almost a third of all the messages for the Brexit
referendum contents in Twitter.
When Cao’s study about organized urls16 is compared with our study,
it will be seen that the main focus of this study16 is to detect organized
URL behaviors, while our study aims to detect organized behaviors. Also,
the extracted and derived features are different from each other. However,
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in both study, same classification method approaches are used and ran-
dom forest algorithm gave the most promising results. Furthermore, when
Ratkiewicz’s study about astroturf political campaigns26 is compared with
our study, same supervised classification methods are used in both stud-
ies, while feature extraction phases are different from each other. In their
study, features are extracted from a constructed graph, while in our study
they are extracted from users and temporal tweets. Also in the study about
group classification27, group behaviors are identified as a result of graph
matching algorithms. In our study no graph related algorithm is used nor a
graph related feature is extracted due to performance concerns for real time
detection.
In the work about28 identifying spam urls, similar works have been done
considering feature extraction and classification methods. However, our
work focuses on detection of organized behavior patterns and features of
user & temporal tweets.
There are also studies about content and group detection which are in
parallel with our study29,30,31. In all studies either underlying content or
group is detected. However, in all of them the detection is done by using
language or topic related features. On the other hand, in our study this
detection has been made with features which do not contain network and
content related features except the sentiment features.
4 Organized Behavior Characteristics
In Twitter approximately 6, 000 tweets are posted per second 9. With such
huge numbers of tweets and users, getting messages seen is not a trivial
task. In order to increase the likelihood of the message’s observation, some
strategies are required.
To gain insight about how organized behavior is manifested in Twitter,
9http://www.internetlivestats.com/twitter-statistics
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specifically in the political domain, we manually inspected tweets with cho-
sen top trend hashtags. These hashtags are selected as candidate organized
hashtags, if they seemed suspicious after reading some of their tweets.
To get larger numbers of such tweets, Twitter Search API is used to
fetch tweet sets for each candidate hashtag. To gain an overall impression,
the following values are computed for each tweet set: the percentage of
distinct words (DW (%)), the average tweet count per user (TPU(µ)), the
percentage of retweets(RT (%)), and the variance and standard deviation of
hashtags (HT (σ2) and HT (σ)). This enabled a comparison among tweet
sets, which are shown in Table 1.
A low value of DW (%) indicates a lack of diversity in vocabulary, while
a high value of TPU(µ) shows that the users who posted in the collection
tend to repeatedly post the same hashtag. Also, high values of HT (σ2) &
HT (σ) indicate the use of multiple hashtags in the collection. This can be
observed in the so-called viral activity, where multiple hashtags are used to
reach as many users as possible. Similarly, high RT (%) values indicate less
original content.
In addition to the statistical computations, for each user in the analyzed
tweet set, other tweet sets with similar hashtag are analyzed to see the user’s
participation with other hashtag also. In this step, two hashtags are thought
as similar if manual inspection of their tweets & hashtag names reveals that
they have a common point based on content and targeted audience. The
amount of users, who exist in multiple tweet set, also considered during
manual inspection of organized tweet sets(see Table 4) .
The manual inspection of these tweet sets (especially the ones about
political propaganda) revealed that the organized behavior characteristics
can be summarized as: sharing a common goal, temporal synchronization
among users, and the dissemination of messages. Similar characteristics are
reported in studies about digital and social media activism32,33,34. Basically,
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Table 1: Tweet sets characteristics inspected during manual inspection.
Hashtag tweets DW TPU RT HT HT
(#) (%) (µ) (%) (σ2) (σ)
#podestaemails15 17,890 4.62 1.89 92.28 2.40 1.54
#BoycottHamilton 56,523 3.92 1.54 2.12 2.72 1.65
#StrongerTogether 13,581 11.9 1.64 77.06 0.46 0.68
#unitedairlines 54,506 8.13 1.28 71.86 0.75 0.86
#womansDay 416,350 7.57 1.38 78.76 0.13 0.36
to make an impact on Twitter, the message has to get seen and spread. The
more it is seen the more it can spread. The more it spreads the more it
persists and is likelier to be seen. In order to detect organized behavior,
we benefit from tweet sets with two criterias: hashtag use and bot account
activity.
Hashtags are used in organized behaviors14,15, because they facilitate a
shared context by grouping disjoint tweets. During the US election 2016, the
#FeelTheBern hashtag is used by supporters of the democratic candidate
Bernie Sanders35. Twitter’s top trend functionality also makes hashtag use
preferable for organized behavior14,15.
Furthermore, the prevailing presence of bot existence in a tweet set sug-
gests the presence of organized behavior. During 2016 US elections, ap-
proximately 400,000 bots generated around 3.8 million tweets4. Similarly,
in the first presidential debate, 1/3 of 1.8 million pro-Trump posts and 1/4
of 600,000 pro-Hillary posts were generated by bots 13. The degree of these
bot tweets and the concentration of their messages on same hashtags36 sug-
gest that these bots post to serve a goal. Likewise, use of pro-Trump bots
for spreading fake news37 also supports this idea. These bot activities in-
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clude all three characteristics of organized behaviors, which were discovered
upon our manual inspection, such as sharing a common goal, the temporal
synchronization of tweets, and the dissemination of messages.
5 An Organized Behavior Detection Model
The automated detection of organized behavior on Twitter calls for methods
that scale to the data corresponding to massive numbers of posts and users.
Machine learning approaches are promising in many classification problems
related to complex large datasets of social big data38.
This work proposes a simple model based on supervised learning meth-
ods. Figure 1 shows the overall approach that consists of two main phases:
feature extraction and model generation. The feature extraction phase han-
dles collecting the tweets of interest and extracting their features. A set of
tweets of interest is referred to as a collection. Tweets of interest are chosen
to be those that contain a specific hashtag, since hashtags are widely used
to increase engagement. Feature extraction is performed on each collection,
resulting in rows of features that are used to train the classifiers.
5.1 Feature Extraction Phase
The feature extraction phase performs two main tasks: preparation of a
collection and extracting its features (Algorithm 1).
A collection is created by fetching tweets with occurrences of a tracedHT
(hashtag of interest). Additional tweets of the users who posted these tweets
are fetched to expand the collection in order to get more information about
them. The resulting collection is referred to with a hashtag (i.e. #lockHerUp
collection). A tracedHT may be associated with multiple collections if they
are created at different times that it is used (i.e. #guncontrol).
Collection expansion consists of fetching additional tweets that were
13
Algorithm 1 Feature extraction algorithm applied to each tweet set.
1: Hashtag tracedHashtag
2: Interval analysisInterval
3: Integer numDays
4: List seedTweets
5: List allUserFeatures = []
6: List allTempFeatures = []
7: List expandedTweets = []
8: seedTweets ← getTweets(hashtag = tracedHashtag) // Step 1
9: users← getUsers(tweets)
10: for all u ∈ users do
11: expandedTweets.add(getTweets(u, numDays, seedTweets) // Step 5
12: end for
13: for all u ∈ users do
14: userFeatures← extractUserFeatures(u,tracedHashtag,
expandedTweets)
15: allUserFeatures.add(< u, userFeatures >)
16: end for
17: timeIntervals← getT imeIntervals(tweets, analysisInterval)
18: for all ti ∈ timeIntervals do
19: tweetsTI ← getTweets(expandedTweets, ti)
20: temporalFeatures← extractTemporalFeatures(tweetsTI)
21: allT empFeatures.add(< u, temporalFeatures >))
22: end for
23: featureStats← computeFeatureStats(allUserFeatures,
allTempFeatures)
24: trainingDataRecord← {allUserFeatures,allTempFeatures,
featureStats}
25: return trainingDataRecord // Step 7
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Figure 1: The overview of generating a classification model for tweet sets.
posted within a given time before and after the time of a post captured
in seed tweets (line 11 in Algorithm 1). In our experiments we chose this du-
ration to be one week. The intent is to capture whether there is a significant
difference in the behavior of a user before and after the time of their post
in seed tweets. The collection of seed tweets expanded with the user tweets
is referred to as the expanded tweet set(ET ). An unqualified reference to a
collection should be interpreted as the expanded tweet set. A reference to
the users in a collection should be interpreted as the users who contributed
to the posts in that collection. Expanding the collection does have a consid-
erable impact on the size of the collection. Table 3 shows size comparisons
of a few sample collections.
All the user and temporal features, as defined in Section 6, are extracted
for each collection and stored in the Features Repository. User features are
computed based on individual characteristics as well as those that compare
a user with others in the collection. The temporal features of tweets are
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computed based on time intervals corresponding to the time period of the
collection (Section 6.2). In our experiments this size was chosen as one hour.
Inspecting the tweets according the time periods attempts to detect the pres-
ence of coordinated posts, since organized activities typically strategically
schedule posting times.
Finally, in order to have an overall view of collections, the mean, variance,
standard deviation, minimum, and maximum values for all the features are
computed and stored in the Features Repository as a row of the training
data set.
5.2 Model Generation Phase
Supervised learning methods are used to train models using the features
extracted for the collections. Three classifiers are generated using the su-
pervised learning methods of random forest, SVM, and logistic regression.
Furthermore, three kinds of classifications are generated: organized be-
havior vs. organic behavior , pro-Trump vs. pro-Hillary, and political vs.
non-political. The models were chosen to explore different contexts of orga-
nized behavior. More specifically, the presence of any kind of organization,
a specific kind of group based organization, and topic based organization.
Section 7.3 provides details about the specific collections, the features
generated from them, the performance of the generated classifiers, and a
comparison of the chosen supervised learning methods.
6 Feature Selection
Based on the characteristics of organized behavior and the manual exami-
nation of large numbers of tweets (Section 4), two kinds of main features are
identified for detecting the presence of organized behavior: user and tempo-
ral features. The user features capture information about the characteristics
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of users. The temporal features focus on the timing of tweets (independent
of who posted them) to detect the presence of a synchronization. Recall
that, the posting time and synchronization are useful for increasing the vis-
ibility of a message. In other words, user features focus on identifying the
participants and the temporal features focus on detecting the presence of
organized behavior.
In order to clearly describe the features consider the sets ST (seed tweets,
Section 5) to be the initial set of tweets fetched with a query for a given
hashtag (tracedHT ). Let ET (Expended Tweet Set, Section 5), be the set of
tweets obtained by expanding ST with additional tweets of users who have
posted a tweet t ∈ ST (see Figure 1).
Table 2 defines a set of functions used to formulate the features. Essen-
tially these functions correspond to data fetched using the Twitter API, thus,
refer to Twitter specific types like Tweet, Hashtag, and Mention. Typed sets
are denoted with a type name subscripted with s. such as Hashtags that
represents a set of hashtags.
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Table 2: Descriptions of user and tweet functions, where T is set of tweets,
t is a tweet, h is a hashtag, u is a user, D is a set of Days, d is a day, ∆ is a
duration
function Type Description
User functions
reg-date(u) Date date u registered
following#(u) Integer number of users that u follows
follower#(u) Integers number of users who follow u
favorite#(u) Integer number of tweets favorited by u
tweets(u, T ) Tweets set of tweets posted by u in T
tweet#(u) Integer number of tweets posted by u
tweetsD(u, T,D) Tweet s s set of tweet sets
(posted by u on d ∈ D)
users(T ) Users set of users in T
hashtag?(u, T, h) (0|1) 1 if user has posted a tweet with h in T ,
0 otherwise
Tweet functions
hashtag#(t) Integer number of hashtags that occur in t
hashtag?(t, h) (0|1) 1 if h ∈ hashtags(t), 0 otherwise
mention#(t) Integer number of mentions that occur in t
hashtagD(T, h) Dates set of days when tweets with
h occur in T
media#(t) Integer number of media that occur in t
retweeted?(t) (0|1) 1 if t is retweeted, 0 otherwise
sentiment(t) (VeryNegative|Negative|Neutral|
Positive|VeryPositive)
mentions(t) Mentions the set of mentions that occur in t
url#(t) Integer number of links (URL) that occur in t
temporalTweets(T,∆) Tweets set of temporal tweets in T based on ∆
18
6.1 User Features
As the creators of the tweets that may be part of some collusion, the char-
acteristics of the contributors are expressed with a set of user features. The
following features are computed for each user, which corresponds to lines
13− 16 of Algorithm 1.
Tweet Count: The total number of tweets posted by a user: tweet#(u).
Used to indicate how active a user is.
Favorited tweet count: The number of tweets that are marked as fa-
vorite10: favorite#(u). Marking tweets as a favorite is an approach used
to gain attention from others to increase follower count (users might follow
those who favorite their tweets).
Average tweets/day: The average number of tweets per day, based on
the number of days since the user registered. Used to understand the user’s
daily tweet frequency, since higher values might indicate the behavior of an
automated account.
tweet#µ/d(u) =
tweet#(u)
today()− regDate(u)
(1)
where today() returns current date and subtraction of days returns the num-
ber of days.
Follower degree: The degree of a user’s followers:
follower-degree(u) =
follower#(u)
follower#(u) + following#(u)
(2)
Follower degrees that approach 1 indicate a high degree of followers that
is typical with popular persons, while degrees approach to 0 indicate the
opposite. Newly created bots tend to follow numerous users and have very
few followers.
10Twitter has renamed Favorite to Like during the final stages of the preparation of this
article.
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Entity use: Entities are used to relate a tweet to other tweets, users,
external resources, or media. They are used to gain attention, therefore a
higher rate would be expected in propaganda. The use of the entity types: 11
URL, Mention, Hashtag, and Media are computed for each u ∈ users(ET ):
hastag-use(u,ET ) =
∑
t∈tweets(u,ET )
hashtag#(t)
| tweets(u,ET ) |
(3a)
url-use(u,ET ) =
∑
t∈tweets(u,ET )
url#(t)
| tweets(u,ET ) |
(3b)
mention-use(u,ET ) =
∑
t∈tweets(u,ET )
mention#(t)
| tweets(u,ET ) |
(3c)
media-use(u,ET ) =
∑
t∈tweets(u,ET )
media#(t)
| tweets(u,ET ) |
(3d)
Traced hashtag use: The number user’s tweets that contain the tracedHT
within ET. Used to understand how focused the user is to the tracedHT.
In organized behavior, it more likely that users concentrated on a hashtag
(Section 4)
user-hashtag-use(u,ET ) =
∑
t∈tweets(u,ET )
hashtag?(t, tracedHT) (4)
Average daily tweets of tracedHT : Focuses on the daily use of the
tracedHT, considering that a participant in propaganda (or similar activity)
would have a persistent use.
tweet-hashtag#µ/d(u,D, T ) =
∑
t∈tweetsD(u,T,D)
hashtag?(t, tracedHT)
| D |
(5)
11For more information about Twitter entities see:
https://developer.twitter.com/en/docs/tweets/data-dictionary/overview/entities-object1
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where T = ET , u ∈ users(T), D = hashtagD(T, tracedHT)
Average Tweets/Day vs. Average daily tweets of tracedHT : This
value is used to understand how the user’s behavior is in the days when she
used tracedHTcompared to her general daily behavior. If a user posts much
more tweets than she normally does for a hashtag, this can be indicator of
an organized behavior.
user-daily-tweet-comparison(u,D,ET ) =
tweet-hashtag#µ/d(u,D,ET )
tweet#µ/d(u)
(6)
User creation date: userReg(u), which can be useful in understanding of
collective behavior of users(see Figure 5).
6.2 Temporal Features
The temporal aspects of tweets focus on the characteristics of tweets in-
dependent of who posted them with the aim of detecting the presence of
a coordinated effort. As was explained in Section4 the dissemination of a
message calls for making it visible, which is achieved by synchronous tar-
geted posting to increase the odds of delivery. Therefore, temporal features
of tweets posted within a certain time period are computed and tracked.
Figure 1 shows the algorithm for computing these features. Unlike with the
user features which consider all of the tweets of users to characterize them,
in the case of the temporal features only tweets that contain the tracedHT
are used. The initial set of tweets that contain tracedHT (ST ) are extended
with tweets posted by u ∈ users(ST ) resulting in ET . The relationship and
frequency of users to tweets are expected to be different in coordinated post-
ing behavior. This section describes the temporal features of tweets posted
during an interval I, where:
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T =
⋃
t∈T
hashtag?(t,tracedHT)=1
temporalTweets(ET, I) : (7)
Entity use: These are just like the computations made for a user, but in
this case the tweet set includes the tweets that were posted during the time
interval by many users:
hashtag-use(T ) =
∑
t∈T
hashtag#(t)
| T |
(8a)
url-use(T ) =
∑
t∈T
url#(t)
| T |
(8b)
mention-use(T ) =
∑
t∈T
mention#(t)
| T |
media-use(T ) =
∑
t∈T
media#(t)
| T |
(8c)
Temporal Tweet Per User (TPU): This feature is used to check tweet
per user in temporal basis. It is extracted because higher values of TPU in
T can be an indicator of organized behavior.
temporal-tpu#(T ) =
∑
t∈T
1
| users(T ) |
(9)
Retweeted tweet features: Features based on retweets can be sign of bot
account existence and organized behavior, because in case of retweets there
is no need to generate a content, which can be challenging for the automated
accounts. The following are computed for the retweeted tweets :
Retweet frequency: The number of retweets ((i.e. if 100 users have
retweeted tx ∈ T , this counts as 100 retweets):
retweet#(T ) =
∑
t∈T
retweeted?(t) (10)
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retweet%(T ) =
retweet#(T )
| T |
(11)
Unique retweeted frequency: The percentage of distinct retweets among
retweeted tweets. It shows the diversity in the retweets. If most of the
retweets are retweets of the same tweet, it can be a sign of a collective
behavior.
original-retweeted-tweet%(T ) =
∣∣∣∣∣ ⋃t∈T
retweeted?=1
{t}
∣∣∣∣∣∑
t∈T
retweeted?(t)
(12)
Retweeting user frequency: Show how many of the users in the tem-
poral tweet set are participated in retweets about tracedHT. If in a tem-
poral tweet set, most of the users are retweeted a tweet about tracedHT,
this can be a sign of collective behavior.
retweeted-users#(T ) =
∑
u∈users(T )
⌈ ∑
t∈tweets(u,T )
retweeted?(t)
| tweets#(u, T ) |
⌉
(13)
retweeted-users%(T ) =
retweeted-users#(T )
| users(T ) |
(14)
Features for tweets that are not retweeted: These features focus on
tweets and users who are not subject to retweeting. They are extracted
because higher values in these features may suggest organic behavior due to
difficulty of creating an original tweet.
Unretweeted tweet frequency:
unretweeted%(T ) = 1− retweet%(T ) (15)
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Users with no retweets frequency:
unretweeted-users%(T ) = 1− retweeted-users%(T ) (16)
Unretweeted tweet count:
unretweeted#(T ) =| T | −retweet#(T ) (17)
Count of users with no retweets frequency:
unretweeted-users#(T ) =| users(T ) | −retweeted-users%(T ) (18)
Ratio of unretweets and users with no retweets:
unretweeted-tweetuserratio(T ) =
unretweeted#(T )
unretweeted− users#(T )
(19)
Mention Features: Since there are usually groups who are pro and against
the candidates in political domain, it is likely that users from different sides
can have a dispute in Twitter. In these disputes, users use mentions to
target other users. Furthermore, in order to propagate messages, bot users
may use mentions to get attention of other users. Therefore, mention related
features could be beneficial for organized behavior detection.
Mention Ratio: Frequency of mentions to distinct mentions:
mention-ratio(T ) =
|
⋃
t∈T
mentions(t) |∑
t∈T
mention#(t)
(20)
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Ratio of mentions in retweets: Frequency of mentions that occur in
retweeted tweets.
mention-RT(T ) =
|
⋃
t∈T
retweeted?(t)=1
mentions(t) |
∑
t∈T
mention#(t) retweeted?(t)
(21)
Ratio of mentions in unretweeted tweets: Frequency of mentions
in tweets that are not retweeted.
mention-notRT(T ) =
|
⋃
t∈T
retweeted?(t)=0
mentions(t) |
∑
t∈T
mention#(t)−
∑
t∈T
mention#(t)retweeted?(t)
(22)
Sentiment Features Within the tweets that contains a mention, the per-
centage of tweets with the sentiments VeryNegative, Negative, Neutral, Posi-
tive, VeryPositive are computed. The sentiment analysis of tweets are deter-
mined using the Stanford Core NLP tool39. In our study, tweet sentiments
are only calculated for reply tweets because of the likelihood of disputes in
political domain. In these disputes, large amount of negative tweets directed
to a user may be sign of organized behavior.
mentioned-sentiment%(s, T ) =
| {t|t ∈ T, sentiment(t) = s} |
|T |
(23)
6.3 Collection Representation
To gain information about a collection its users and tweets (within a time
interval) are characterized by numerous features extracted from data fetched
from Twitter. This feature extraction phase yields a large set of features
representing each user and temporal analysis. Any assessment about the
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collection requires the representation of the collection as a whole, which will
be used in the training data set.
Collections are uniformly represented by distributing the extracted val-
ues for each user feature into buckets defined for each feature. Each feature
value is placed in the bucket whose criteria it matches. As an example,
consider Figure 2, which shows the hashtags posted by the users of the
#draintheswamp collection based on Equation 4. These values are summa-
rized as follows: hashtagPostCount 1 : 12.2%, hashtagPostCount 2 : 6.9%,...,
hashtagPostCount 100-... : 3.44%. Note that, the buckets are defined based
on the observations from inspecting many collections.
In addition to the feature buckets, the mean, variance, standard devi-
ation, minimum and maximum values are computed for each feature. All
these values associated with a collection are stored in the Feature Reposi-
tory (Algorithm 1).
On the other hand, in the summarization of temporal features, the values
are not separated to the bucket values. For each temporal interval feature,
statistical values(mean, variance, standard deviation, min & max values)
are calculated. Figure 3 and Figure 4 illustrate the extracted temporal
features(Equation 8 - Equation 17,18 ) of #draintheswamp collection.
In the training data set, the resulting collection representation is used.
7 Experiments and Results
To assess the performance of the proposed approach, the classifier models
are tested on the training data set using 10-fold cross validation. The results
were promising for the organized behavior classification. This motivated us
to proceed with the generation of two more classifiers that use the same
features for two different classification problems: political vs. non-political
and pro-Trump vs pro-Hillary. For each classification task, the training data
set is labeled differently.
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1Figure 2: Percentage of users based tweet counts with #draintheswamp
hashtag (Equation 4)
Figure 3: Hourly entity ratios of #draintheswamp hashtag(Equation 8)
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Figure 4: Hourly Distribution of non-retweet count and distinct user count
of #draintheswamp hashtag(Equation 17,18 )
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7.1 Data: Tweet Sets
Training data sets are generated by using extracted features from expanded
tweet sets(ET ) In the training data set a row is labeled with the label of
the collection it is generated from. Table 3 show the sizes of ST (#ST ), ET
(#ET), the number of tweets used for temporal features extraction (#TFT)
and number of users(#Users) for some collections 12.
Table 3: The number of tweets and users in various labeled collections. The
expansion of the seed collections result in significant increases in number of
tweets.
Hashtag #ST #ET #TFT #Users Label
#imwithher 35,362 4,411,703 75,681 15,792 organized
#maga 65,643 4,193,718 171,991 13,773 organized
#crookedhillary 18,999 3,773,531 34,190 8,159 organized
#votetrump 40,282 3,058,863 60,934 10,810 organized
#ladygaganewvideo 2,041 310,908 7,129 1,486 organized
#news 32,949 2,425,145 191,856 6,020 organic
#oscarfail 2,111 749,748 2,152 1,507 organic
#thanksgiving 4,575 539,081 4,461 2,367 organic
#brangelina 2,288 347,596 2,961 1,676 organic
#unitedairlines 1,345 276,228 2,240 898 organic
12Sizes of the all collections in data set: https://github.com/Meddre5911/DirenajToolkitService/blob/master/organizedBehaviorDataSets/OrganizedBehaviorDataSetSizes.csv
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7.1.1 Organized Tweet Sets
To create a training data set, first ST consisting of tweets with a hash-
tag must be gathered. A hashtag is labeled as organized if the presence of
organized behavior is observed within its tweets based on our manual in-
spection (i.e. #LadyGagaNewVideo, #podestaemails, #podestaemails13,
#podestaemails20, #BoycottHamilton). Suitable hashtags reported the
news or literature are also labeled organized (i.e. #tcot & #pjnet based on
a study14). Hashtags used by large amount of bots during the 2016 US elec-
tion are also labeled as organized13. These hashtags are reported in studies
regarding the prevalence of bot accounts during the 2016 US election13,4,40.
For externally discovered hashtags, if their bot based content generation
is greater than 20%, a collection is created for them (i.e. #AmericaFirst,
#MakeAmericaGreatAgain, #TrumpPence16, #NeverHillary, #VoteTrump,
#CrookedHillary, #LoveTrumpsHate, #NeverTrump, #StrongerTogether,
#ImWithHer, #UniteBlue.)
When seeking for candidate hashtags, we create a backlog. The ones
that are not yet manually inspected are compared with collections known
to be organized. If there are significant number of overlapping users, the
hashtag is considered as organized. This is due to the observation that
colluding users are active over time and use several persisting hashtags to
manipulate others. Table 4 shows the users who participated in multiple
pro-Trump hashtags in different times. Furthermore, the percentage of users
who registered after July 201514 are in increasing trend (Figure 5). A sus-
pected hashtag is labeled as organized if at least 20 percent of its users
participated in bot based collections. Some of the tweet sets labeled in this
manner are based on hashtags of #benghazi, #obamacarefail, #imvotingbe-
13In the first presidential debate, 32.7 percent of pro-Trump hashtags and 22.3 percent
of pro-Hillary hashtags were posted by bots13
14The official nomination of Trump for presidency.
30
cause, #draintheswamp, #trumpwon, #clintonemails, #auditthevote, and
#hillaryemails.
In the tweet sets collected at different timess based on the bots cited in13
and4 numerous common hashtags were observed (i.e. #election2016,#tcot,
#imwithher, #nevertrump, #neverhillary, #trumppence2016, #p2). This
suggests that the use of some hashtags persist throughout a campaign, such
as the observed in the US election 2016 campaign. This is not surprising,
since hashtags serve as group specific identifiers that serve to unite messages
and people.
Table 4: An example organized collection (#benghazi) whose users are found
in other trending collections.
Traced hashtag #benghazi
Time Interval 24 Oct - 1 Nov 2016
User# 7, 854
Collections with mutual users with #benghazi
Traced Hashtag Interval User#
⋂
(#)
⋂
(%)
#podestaemails 17-24 Oct 32, 794 3, 232 41.15
#crookedhillary 04-10 Nov 16, 854 2, 291 29.17
#makeamericagreatagain 04-10 Nov 27, 625 2, 311 29.42
#boycotthamilton 17-22 Nov 36, 561 1, 580 20.12
#maga 20-28 Nov 29, 130 3, 063 39.00
7.1.2 Organic Tweet Sets
Hashtags are labeled as organic when they are deemed to be spontaneously
posted. In case of trending topics, such hashtags emerge due to events
like holidays, natural disaster, and news about popular people. For ex-
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1Figure 5: Percentage of same users in Table 4 (users in #benghazi &
#crookedHillary) based on Twitter registration date
ample, the hashtags related the United Airlines, such as #unitedairlines,
#boycottUnitedAirlines, #newunitedairlinesmottos, instantly became pop-
ular after a video of passenger, who was forcibly removed from a plane due
to over booking, went viral. Similarly, during the 2017 Oscars ceremony, the
#oscarsfail hashtag became top trending after the best picture award was
accidentally given to wrong movie.
Hashtags related to special days like #Thanksgiving, #LaborDay, #Na-
tionalSiblingsDay, and #WomansDay are also tagged as organic, since these
hashtags are used by a large number of diverse people. Likewise, topic
centric hashtags are widely used by diverse sets of users, such as #news,
#deeplearning, and #bigdata are labeled as organic.
However, recall that during the labelling of organized hashtags, we la-
belled hashtags as organized in case of considerable amount of their con-
tents are created by automated bots. For the hashtags of #Thanksgiving,
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#LaborDay, #NationalSiblingsDay, and #WomansDay, it is also possible
that they may contain bot activity, especially when they are trending topics.
In order to understand the level of bot existence in these organic hash-
tags, we examined characteristics of their tweets by calculating statistical
values of DW (%), TPU(µ), RT (%), HT (σ2), and HT (σ) (the metrics used
during the manual inspection of tweets in Section 4). As a result of these
calculations, we conclude that these hashtags are used spontaneously.
For example, given the values for #womansDay shown in Table 1, higher
value of DW (%) indicates less similar messages, and lower value of TPU(µ)
shows less multiple posts by the same users. Likewise, lower values of
HT (σ2) & HT (σ) indicate less hashtag use in #womansDay tweets.
Furthermore, the overlapping users in organic hashtags inspected with
the idea that if a user is present in numerous organic hashtags, it may be
an incidence of bots hijacking trending hashtags. Table 4 shows overlapping
users in multiple hashtags regarding special days, however their percentage
is very low compared to those in organized hashtags(see Table 4).
7.1.3 Political vs. Non-Political
The labeling of political and non-political hashtags are done by manual
inspecting ST. The data set labeled as political is created from 2016 US
election data. The determination of a label was fairly straightforward in
comparison to organized behavior.
7.1.4 Pro-Trump, Pro-Hillary, Neither
Specifically in political campaigns, there are strong groups who are pro and
against certain candidates. Meticulous attention is given to reaching people
and delivering propaganda that supports their candidate and damages other
candidates. In the 2016 US election the political campaigns were fierce
and quite different than earlier campaigns. Heavy use of social media was
33
Table 5: An example organic collection (#internationalwomensday) whose
users are found in other trending collections.
Traced hashtag #internationalwomensday
Time Interval 07− 09 March 2017
User# 267, 695
Collections with mutual users with #internationalwomensday
Traced Hashtag Interval User#
⋂
(#)
⋂
(%)
#Thanksgiving 20-28.Nov.16 104, 060 6, 247 6
#Oscars 25.Feb-01.Mar.17 134, 868 12, 656 9.38
#NationalPetDay 09-14.Apr.2017 39,506 3, 095 7.83
#NationalSiblingsDay 09-14.Apr.2017 58, 908 4, 220 7.16
#WorkersDay 30.Apr-02.May.2017 1, 269 71 5.59
#MothersDay 13-15.May.2017 113, 225 8, 207 7.25
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deployed from within the country as well as from other countries. Just what
happened during the campaign and elections has been a topic of heated
debate that is unfolding at the time of writing this paper.
The hashtags are mainly selected and labeled based on given pro-Trump
and pro-Hillary hashtags in the work on bots and automation in Twitter13,
The remaining hashtags are manually labeled as usual (with use of Table 4
and Table 5), except for hashtags that do not belong to either class that are
labeled as None.
7.2 Training Data Sets
The labels of training data sets for each category are as follows15:
organic vs organized : 851 records of which 625 are labeled as orga-
nized and 226 organic.
political vs non-political : 879 records of which 231 are labeled as
non-political and 648 political.
pro-Trump vs pro-Hillary : 854 records of which 311 are labeled as
pro-Trump, 171 pro-Hillary, and 371 None.
For each category, four different training data sets are generated based
on the features of all collections: (1) all extracted features, (2) principal
components of all extracted features obtained from PCA(see Section 2.2),
(3) all extracted features except user features based on tracedHT (see Equa-
tions 4,5,6), and (4) principal components of the features in (3).
Data sets (3) and (4) ignore tracedHT related user features for the pur-
pose of assessing how the model behaves when the features of the hashtag
that were used to fetch the initial data are eliminated. Since hashtags are
not the only mechanism for coordination on Twitter, one would expect the
15Training data sets can be found in https://github.com/Meddre5911/DirenajToolkitService/tree/master/organizedBehaviorDataSets/trainingDataSets
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method to remain successful. By removing the tracedHT related features in
Equations 4,5,6, we can see how reliant the detection is to hashtags.
In the second and fourth data sets, PCA is used in order to examine
impact of dimension reduction on the performance of the classification, with
consideration of the need for real-time processing. Table 3 provides infor-
mation about the size of some collections in the collection repository. Even
though the size of collections are highly limited by Twitter Search API,
(#ET) sizes are in the millions.
7.3 Results of three Classifers
The model is evaluated for each classifier and data set, using 10-fold cross
validation. The organic vs organized and political vs non-political are bi-
nary classification models, whereas the pro-Trump vs pro-Hillary vs None
classification is a multi-classification problem.
Results show that the random forest algorithm results in high scores
with full features, while logistic regression and SVM algorithms give better
results when PCA is applied.
Furthermore, the performance with Data Set 3 and 4 shows that the
presence or absence of tracedHT is not essential to capture organized be-
havior. Tables 6, 7, and 8 show the results for each category. SVM results
are not provided for pro-Trump vs pro-Hillary classification due to lack of
support for multi-classification with SVM in Spark MlLib23.
7.4 Top five features of classifications
Feature selection is important for improving accuracy and decreasing train-
ing time. The following sections enumerate the top five features16 for each
16Features are selected using the ClassifierSubsetEval attribute evaluator with the Ran-
dom Forest classifier and the Best First search method in the Weka24 by applying 10 fold
cross validation
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Table 6: Evaluation of alternative approaches for classifying organic vs.
organized collections. F is F-Measure, A is Accuracy, and ROC is Receiver
Operating Characteristic.
Features Method A F ROC
All Random Forest 0.99 0.99 0.99
Features Logistic Regression 0.99 0.99 0.99
SVM 0.75 0.64 0.66
PCA Random Forest 0.98 0.97 0.96
of all Logistic Regression 0.98 0.98 0.98
Features SVM 0.99 0.99 1.00
All except Random Forest 0.99 0.99 0.99
tracedHT Logistic Regression 0.99 0.98 0.97
Features SVM 0.75 0.64 0.66
PCA of all Random Forest 0.97 0.96 0.95
except tracedHT Logistic Regression 0.98 0.98 0.97
Features SVM 0.99 0.99 0.99
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Table 7: Results of alternative approaches to classifying Political vs. Non-
Political collections. F is F-Measure, A is Accuracy, and ROC is Receiver
Operating Characteristic.
Features Method A F ROC
All Random Forest 0.99 0.99 0.99
Features Logistic Regression 0.99 0.99 0.99
SVM 0.77 0.65 0.64
PCA Random Forest 0.99 0.98 0.97
of all Logistic Regression 0.98 0.98 0.98
Features SVM 1.00 0.99 1.00
All except Random Forest 0.99 0.99 0.99
tracedHT Logistic Regression 0.99 0.99 0.99
Features SVM 0.77 0.65 0.64
PCA of all Random Forest 0.98 0.98 0.98
except tracedHT Logistic Regression 0.99 0.98 0.99
Features SVM 1.00 0.99 1.00
Table 8: Results of alternative approaches for classification of Pro-Hillary
vs. Pro-Trump vs None collections. A is accuracy, F is F-measure, P is
precision, and R is recall.
Features Method A F P R
All Random Forest 0.97 0.96 0.97 0.96
Features Logistic Regression 0.44 0.20 0.15 0.33
PCA of all Random Forest 0.92 0.90 0.93 0.88
Features Logistic Regression 0.94 0.93 0.93 0.93
All except Random Forest 0.96 0.95 0.96 0.94
tracedHTFeatures Logistic Regression 0.44 0.20 0.15 0.33
PCA of all except Random Forest 0.92 0.89 0.93 0.87
tracedHT Features Logistic Regression 0.93 0.91 0.92 0.91
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classification.
References to related functions and feature equations are provided next
to the features. C refers to a collection and U = users(C). All features
assume u ∈ U , additional constraints are expressed when relevant. Percent-
ages, frequencies, maximum, minimum, σ2, and σ values are computed over
t ∈ C and u ∈ tweets(u,C). For details regarding the functions and fea-
tures see Section 6. The most important five features during classifications
for each data set are :
Organic vs. Organized
All features:
1. σ2 of media-use(u,C) [Eq. 3]
2. % of users such that follower-degree(u) > 1 [Eq. 2]
3. % of users such that 1 ≤ favorite#(u) ≤ 100
4. Minimum of tweet#(u)
5. Maximum tweet-hashtag#µ/d(u,D,C) [Eq. 6
All features excluding the hashtags:
1. # of users such that 0.6 ≤ media-use(u,C) ≤ 0.9 [Eq. 3d]
2. # of users such that hashtag-use(u,C) = 7 [Eq. 3a]
3. # of users such that mention-use(u,C) = 10 [Eq. 3c]
4. Minimum of follower-degree(u) [Eq. 2]
5. # of users such that 1 ≤ favorite#(u) ≤ 100
Political vs. Non-Political classification results
All features:
1. σ2 of media-use(u,C) [Eq. 3d]
2. Maximum of mention-use(u,C) of all users [Eq. 3c]
3. µ of follower-degree(u) [Eq. 2]
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4. µ of 10.001 ≤ favorite#(u) ≤ 20.000
5. Maximum of tweet#(u)
All features excluding the hashtags:
1. σ2 of media-use(u,C) [Eq. 3d]
2. µ of follower-degree(u) [Eq. 2]
3. % of users such that 10.001 ≤ favorite#(u) ≤ 20.000
4. % of users such that 10.001 ≤ tweet#(u) ≤ 20.000
5. Maximum of tweet#(u)
pro-Hillary vs. pro-Trump vs. None
All features:
1. % of users such that 0.0001 ≤ media-use(u,C) ≤ 0.5 [Eq. 3]
2. % of users such that url-use(u,C) = 1 [Eq. 3b]
3. % of users such that mention-use(u,C) = 7 [Eq. 3c)
4. σ2 of url-use(u,C) [Eq. 3b]
5. % of users such that mention-use(u,C)tweet#µ/d(u)
= 1 [Eq. 6 & Section 6.3]
All features excluding the hashtags:
1. % of users such that mention-use(u,C) = 0 [Eq. 3c]
2. % of users such that 0.0001 ≤ media-use(u,C) =≤ 0.5 [Eq. 3a]
3. % of users such that 0.0001 ≤ mention-use(u,C) ≤ 0.5 [Eq. 3c]
4. % of users such that url-use(u,C) = 1 [Eq. 3]
5. % of users such that 1 ≤ favorite#(u) ≤ 100
It is surprising that none of the temporal features are in top five fea-
tures, suggesting that organized behavior detection could be achieved by
extracting user features only. One of the most common advise for increas-
ing engagement is the timing of posts to increase likelihood of visibility. The
top user-based are also reported in other studies28,16, which is encouraging.
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Compared to temporal features, extracting user features is easier and more
efficient. A classifier based only on user features might be useful.
The use of media stands out as an important factor, appearing in the top
5 of every classification. This is not surprising, since it is generally known
that tweets with media are viewed the most. Bots and trolls use regularly
use them. The consistent use of media entities can be observed from the
variance. Furthermore, consistent use of media results in high media ratio
for the user (Equation 2), which may signal bots or users in some organized
behavior.
A follower degree of 1 means that the user does not follow anyone. To be
effective, organized users are expected to follow users. Therefore, a follower
degree value 1 would likely identify an organic collection. On the contrary,
a follower degree of 0 implies not being popular – having 0 followers. Newly
deployed bots often have 0 followers37.
Furthermore, a user’s tweet# and favorite# are helpful in classification.
When these values are in the thousands they are more likely to be associated
to an automated user, whereas low values indicate regular users.
Very high URL, hashtag, and mention ratios imply the occurrence of
multiple such entities in most of their tweets (Equation 3). Dedicating the
small space provided by a tweet to deliver several entities suggests an intent
to become more visible. Mentions trigger notification to the mentioned and
it may also noticed by the follower of the mentioned person. URLs extend
the information that can be delivered by luring a user to an external site.
Finally, a high mention rate points to interaction with other users.
The daily hashtag rate (Eq. 6) shows the daily use of the tracedHT
during the days that hashtag is used in Twitter. A higher frequency of
tweets than typical on a given day compounded by the occurence of the
tracedHT suggests an organized behavior.
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8 Discussion
The results presented in Section 7 are promising for detecting various kinds
of organized behavior. There are numerous directions to pursue in terms of
extending the model, implementation techniques, and data collection.
The three classification experiments (organized vs organic; political vs
non-political; and pro-Trump vs pro-Hillary vs None) are somewhat differ-
ent, focusing on the presence of any, topic-based, and group-based orga-
nization respectively. All three models are trained with the same features
and all yield promising results. Based on these results we speculate that
the proposed features may fingerprint tweet collections, at least in terms of
their nature.
It could be that our data set is too small even though it contains millions
of tweets17. On the other hand, user features may indeed be most significant
ones by shining light on the the characteristic of those who are in collusion.
A classifier model generated solely based on user features may be worth
developing, since it is fairly easy and cost effective, which would be beneficial
for real-time classification.
Collection labeling is performed by manual inspection, which is enor-
mously time consuming and error prone. While the visualization tools that
we created to summarize collections help, the task remains difficult. We
spent endless hours inspecting thousands of tweets and in deliberation. Bet-
ter approaches for labeling training data sets should be explored.
The approach to constructing and processing collections must be sys-
tematically investigated to study the impact of various choices. While the
use of hashtags is simple and powerful, they are not the only mechanism
for coordination and organization on Twitter. During our experiments, by
using data sets, which ignore tracedHT related features (Section 7.2), we
17For details see: https://github.com/Meddre5911/DirenajToolkitService/blob/master/organizedBehaviorDataSets/OrganizedBehaviorDataSetSizes.csv
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aimed to test performance of our approach in case of tweets are collected
based on other mechanisms such as community detection41,42 algorithms or
topic detection43 methods.
The aim of the present work was to develop a basic model for detecting
patterns of organized behavior on Twitter. Limited resources also played
a role in keeping it simple, however, it is interesting to learn how simple
approaches perform. We examined many features that are not in the current
model that are related to tweet content, users relations, and information
flow patterns. We observed the presence of unusually similar content posted
by the same persons or those connected to them during the same interval,
presumably serving a shared agenda. Similarity computation among all
tweets in a set is very costly (complexity of O(n2))– a task that exhausted
our resources. Efficient approaches to compare large sets of posts is an
interesting research direction.
Tightly connected communities can be very effective in propagating in-
formation. In popular context, such as political campaigns, follow relations
exceeding 50K are not uncommon. When the followers of followers of thou-
sands of people are considered, the computation of closeness centrality be-
comes challenge. Limiting the number of hops to 2 nodes, the users stored
in a Neo4j18 graph database became overwhelming. Alternative approaches
to address closeness centrality is an interesting direction.
Another observation is information flow patterns, for example recurring
message paths, such as A tweets tx, which is retweeted by B, which is
retweeted by C. Here the usersA,B,C remain the same, wheras the message
ti may vary. Such pattern suggests presence of coordination, quite possibly
automated.
Although, the current model does not include many features we exam-
ined, they remain of great interest. The features we did include are those
18Neo4j version:2.1.2
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we considered to be significant and whose computation was in the realm of
our resources. Unfortunately, tweet sentiment detection, which is a highly
explored area, has limited success due to the nature of tweets being short,
messy, unconventional, and satirical. The performance of Stanford NLP
tool44 used in this work is insufficient as of yet.
A great deal of effort went into developing the feature extraction system
to produce the training data set. Many performance issues were experienced
related to processing big data. Big Data systems used for real-time detec-
tion require high memory and high processing power (GPU) to run complex
algorithms on very large data. To prevent excessive database I/O, in mem-
ory graph databases needs to be used. Big data frameworks and tools are
appropriate for social media data, which is vast and created in a continuous
flow.
Our prototype implementation uses MongoDB. As the table sizes and
I/O requests increased the performance of queries dramatically decreases
(in spite of index use). To prevent bottlenecks in one table, temporary
tables were created with indexes to reduce the wait-time. Unfortunately, I/O
bottlenecks persisted. For real time decision and detection systems there is a
need for tools like Apache Spark45, which supports terabyte-scale in-memory
data processing. Our repository is more than 480 gigabytes with over 200
million tweets, summary tables, indexes. A Spark cluster can process all
that data in memory. Also, the Spark GraphX API would increase the
feature extraction performance, especially for graph based features.
Our observations have strengthened our belief in how relevant it is to de-
tect misinformation and manipulation. With manipulators on social media
getting more sophisticated, we expect that the detection of their activities
will get more difficult.
To summarize, the results of this work are encouraging with many fu-
ture directions to pursue. The main future directions are with respect to
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validation, improved features, performance, and domain specific detections.
9 Conclusions
This work proposes a supervised learning based model for automatically
classifying tweet sets that exhibits organized behavior patterns. Towards
this end models are trained with user and temporal features extracted from
over 200 million tweets that were mostly gathered during the 2016 US pres-
idential election.
Three types of classifications were performed among the categories: [or-
ganic,organized], [political, non-political], and [pro-Trump,pro-Hillary,None].
In each case, the random forest algorithm consistently resulted in high ac-
curacy and f-measure scores with an average of 0.95.
The results of classifying tweet sets suggest that neither content nor
user relation features are required to successfully classify them. Further-
more, that user features are the most significant regarding our classification
tasks. Further investigated with larger training data sets should be perform
to further validate. Features like the closeness centrality and tweet similarity
are very costly, therefore it is encouraging that the detection of organized
behavior can be achieved without them. Organized vs organic behavior clas-
sification is well suited for politics and campaigns, as the organizing efforts
carried out in Twitter are well captured in the model and features. The
results are encouraging and we intend to pursue this work and its domain
specific applications.
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